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COPYRIGHT LAW-VIDEOTAPING LIVE TELEVISION NEWS 
BROADCASTS FOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES-WXIA -TV v . .Duncan, 8 
MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2075 (N.D. Ga. June 28, 1982). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A new area of copyright concern has been created with the ad­
vent of videotape recording and the verbatim reproduction of televi­
sion programs. l Until recently, videotape technology was used 
almost exclusively within the communications industry.2 As the 
equipment became more compact, less expensive, and easier to oper­
ate, however, it entered the consumer market, bringing with it addi­
tional legal issues.3 Widespread access to a capability formerly 
possessed by only a few has raised new questions concerning the 
rights to programming which can be copied by the videotape pro­
cess. Public attention has most recently been drawn to the Sony 
Betamax case,4 which deals with the non-commercial home use of 
entertainment programming. 5 The decision in the Sony case, how­
ever, leaves unresolved many of the copyright problems created by 
videotaping.6 
WXIA -TV v. .Duncan 7 addressed the copyright problems 
brought about by videotaping a local news broadcast for commercial 
purposes.8 .Duncan is but one of many possible variations on the 
Sony theme and it has the potential for establishing the criteria for 
1. HOUSE COMMITIEE ON THE JUDICIARY H.R. REp. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 
32 (1967). See also H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 1976 
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5659, 5680 and NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECH­
NOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT 79 (Libr. ofCong. ed. 1979). 
2. S. MAHONEY, N. DE MARTINO, & R. STENGEL, KEEPING PACE WITH THE NEW 
TELEVISION 157 (1980). 
3. Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp., 480 F. Supp. 429, 435 (C.D. Cal. 1979), 
q/f'd in part, rev'd in part, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), cerl granted, 457 U.S. 1116 
(1982), 52 U.S.L.W. 4090 (U.S. Jan 17, 1984). 
4. Id. 
5. 659 F.2d at 969. 
6. Examples include the videotaping of news for commercial and non-commercial 
use; the videotaping of entertainment and non-entertainment materials distributed by 
pay cable for commercial use. 
7. 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2075 (N.D. Ga. June 28, 1982). 
8. Id. at 2076. 
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analyzing one of the unresolved copyright issues spawned by video­
tape technology in the area of television news. 
The defendant, Carolyn Duncan, operates TV News Clips, a 
business which regularly monitors and records local television news 
programs.9 Subsequently, she offers the clips for sale to the subjects 
of the newscasts. lO On March 11, 1981, Ms. Duncan made an off­
the-airll videotape recording of a WXIA-TV news story entitled 
"Fitness Trail,"12 which she later sold to a client. 13 
Shortly thereafter, plaintiff, WXIA-TV, brought suit in the Fed­
eral District Court for the Northern District of Georgia and sought 
an injunction against defendant, TV News Clips, to prevent sale and 
distribution of videotape copies of its copyrighted newscasts. 14 Plain­
tiff maintained that the unauthorized copying of its telecast consti­
tuted a violation of copyrightl5 and that the sale of those copies 
impinged on WXIA-TV's market for sale of clips to the subjects of 
news stories. 16 Defendant contended that its business activities fell 
within the "fair use" exception 17 to the copyright laws. 18 
Plaintiff's motion and defendant's cross motion for summary 
judgment were denied by the court. 19 The court held that the lack of 
factual information necessary to make a determination of fair use20 
made summary judgment untenable. Specifically, the court lacked 
data on the extent of the television station's existing and planned 
market for the sale of clips of its news stories.21 
9. Id. 
10. /d. 
II. "Qff-the-air" is defined as the direct transmission of a radio signal from the 
transmitter of the broadcaster to a television or radio receiver. The signal is transmitted 
through the air and no hard wires connect the transmission facility with the receiver. 
The signal is received nearly simultaneously with broadcast. This is the method used by 
television broadcasters. Cable operators pick up the off-the-air signals of broadcasters 
and retransmit those signals by hard wire (cable) to their subscribers. D. PEMBER, MASS 
MEDIA LAW 471 (2d ed. 1981). 
12. WXIA-TV v. Duncan, 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 2076. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 2078-79. 
17. See infra text accompanying notes 37-41. The Copyright Act of 1976 provides 
a "fair use" defense to copyright infringement which states in part: "In determining 
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be 
considered shall include-... (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.c. § 107 (Supp. V 1981). 
18. 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 2076. 
19. Id. at 2080. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 2076, 2080. 
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In denying the motions, the court focused on the actual and po­
tential market for the sale of videotape television news stories.22 Al­
though the court thought it imperative to be able to define the 
markets of the clipping service and the television station in order to 
determine if there was any prejudice to the copyright holder's mar­
ket,23 a more novel issue was also raised. The court questioned 
whether WXIA-TV, in light of its duties as a public trustee, could 
maintain its requisite journalistic integrity and still exploit a market 
for the sale of video clips among the subjects of its news stories.24 
The court noted that dealings in this secondary market could suggest 
a lack of impartiality or staging of the news by the television station 
which would violate its public trust.25 
This casenote will first examine the legal history which provides 
the setting for current videotape copyright issues. Existing videotape 
decisions will be surveyed to demonstrate that, until now, courts and 
commentators have had to deal only with the videotaping of en­
tertainment programming. The application of fair use analysis in 
Duncan then will be examined to illustrate that the court has taken 
note of the significance of the difference in content in news program­
ming. Next, the legal characteristics of broadcast news will be ex­
plained in order to decide whether those characteristics which 
distinguish this case should be the basis for an analysis different 
from that used by courts in the previous copyright cases.26 Finally, 
the casenote will consider whether the approach suggested m 
Duncan should be applied in future news broadcast cases. 
II. THE LEGAL SETTING 
A. Historical Setting oj Copyright Law 
Copyright law in the United States is derived from the Copy­
right Clause of the Constitution: "The Congress shall have Power 
... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing 
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries ...."27 
The purpose of the copyright clause is to advance the dissemi­
22. Id. at 2078. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 2078 n.9. See infra text accompanying notes 95-101 (explaining that a 
broadcaster holds its license as a public trustee and is obligated to operate in the public 
interest and to present news which is not staged or distorted). 
25. 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 2078 n.9. 
26. See infra text accompanying notes 84-88. 
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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nation of information for the benefit of society.28 The framers of the 
Constitution chose an economic mechanism to achieve that pur­
pose.29 The Supreme Court's analysis of the copyright clause has fo­
cused on the built-in economic motivation of temporary monopoly.30 
The economic philosophy on which the clause is based is the belief 
that the prospect of personal gain will induce authors and inventors 
to use their talents to advance the public welfare.31 
Congress has embodied this constitutional power in the Copy­
right Act of 1976.32 Section 106 of the Act provides that "the owner 
of copyright. . . has the exclusive rights. . . to reproduce the copy­
righted work ... [and] to distribute copies ... of the copyrighted 
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership...."33 
Works that may be afforded copyright protection under section 106 
are listed in the Act and include all original works, fixed in a tangi­
ble form, including motion pictures or other audiovisual works.34 
The violation of any of the copyright holder's exclusive rights, as set 
out in section 106 of the Act, constitutes copyright infringement35 
and is the basis for an action.36 
28. L. SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT 8 (1978). 
29. Id. 
30. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
31. Id. The Court elaborated: "Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities 
deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered." Id. 
32. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2451 (codified at 17 U.S.c. §§ 101-810 (Supp. V 
1981». 
33. 17 U.S.c. § 106(1), (3) (Supp. V 1981). 
34. 17 U.S.c. § 102(a)(6) (Supp. V 1981). The work in dispute in WXIA-TV v. 
Duncan is an audiovisual work as defined in 17 U.S.c. § 101 (Supp. V 1981): "'Audiovi­
sual works' are works that consist of a series of related images which are intrinsically 
intended to be shown by the use of machines, or ... electronic equipment, together with 
accompanying sounds. . . regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as films 
or tapes, in which the works are embodied." Id. As explained in § 102(a), the two fun­
damental criteria required for copyright protection are originality and fixation in tangi­
ble form. Id. Fixation is defined in § 101 which states: 
A work is "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a 
copy ... , by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or 
stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated for a 
period of more than transitory duration. A work . . . is "fixed" . . . if a fixa­
tion of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission. 
Id. In his treatise, I M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 1-49 (rev. ed. 1981), Professor 
Nimmer traces the root of this section of the Act: "If the word 'writings' [in the copyright 
clause of the Constitution) is to be given any meaning whatsoever, it must, at the very 
least, denote 'some material form, capable of identification and having a more or less 
permanent endurance.''' Id. (quoting Canadian Admiral Corp. v. Reditfusion, Inc. Can. 
Exch., 382, 383 (1954». 
35. 17 U.S.c. § 501(a) (Supp. V 1981). 

36~ Id. § 501(b). 
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B. Fair Use 
Copyright law, however, grants only a limited monopoly and 
the Act specifies certain limitations on the exclusive rights enunci­
ated in section 106.37 In cases involving videotaping of copyrighted 
program material, the courts have dealt principally with the defense 
embodied in section 107 of the Act: "Limitations on exclusive rights: 
Fair use." That section states: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of 
a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies 
or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, 
for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teach­
ing. . . ,scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copy­
right. In determining whether the use made of a work in any 
particular case is a fair use, the factors to be considered shall 
include­
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation 
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of 
the copyrighted work. 38 
The question of copyright infringement arises when the user 
copies from an original to the extent that the copy bears a substantial 
similarity to the original work.39 Fair use, then, is a privilege ac­
corded to persons who do not own the copyright, to use copyrighted 
material in a reasonable manner without the consent of the owner, 
37. See supra text accompanying note 33. 
38. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. v 1981). The concept of fair use in the United States 
was developed in case law and originally appeared in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 27 
(C.C.O. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). The doctrine was first included in a federal copyright 
statute when Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1976 without altering the common 
law doctrine. O. JOHNSTON, COPYRIGHT HANDBOOK 131 (2d ed. 1982). 
39. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 13-56 (rev. ed. 1981) describes the cir­
cumstances in which fair use is a defense: 
That problem arises where it is established. . . that the defendant has copied 
sufficiently from the plaintiff so as to cross the line of substantial similarity. 
The result must necessarily constitute an infringement unless the defendant is 
rendered immune from liability because the particular use which he has made 
of plaintiffs material is a 'fair use.' . . . Here 'fair use' is a defense. . . despite 
the fact that the similarity is substantial. 
/d. 
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despite the owner's statutory monopoly.40 It has been suggested that 
the most serviceable characterization of fair use is that it is a "use 
necessary for the furtherance of knowledge, literature and the arts 
and does not deprive the creator of the work of an appropriately 
expected economic reward."41 
The legislative history of the Copyright Act indicates an intent 
to keep the statutory fair use provisions broad enough to be adapta­
ble to technological advancements.42 This is especially significant in 
the videotaping cases where one of the characteristics of the medium 
is that all copies are verbatim and therefore automatically overstep 
the threshold of substantial similarity.43 
The Copyright Act of 1976 has made special provisions only for 
certain express types of off-the-air videotaping activities: the taping 
of audiovisual news programs by libraries and archives44 and the 
taping of certain other audiovisual works by noncommercial broad­
casting entities.45 These statutory provisions, and the narrow hold­
ings of the videotape cases which have been decided to date,46 
comprise the body of existing law in this field, leaving many ques­
tions unresolved.47 The cases prior to Duncan presented the vide­
otaping problem in the context of entertainment programming. 
Consequently, it is necessary to determine whether previous analyses 
40. BALL, COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944) (quoted in Rosemont 
Enters. v. Random House, 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966». For example, if an excerpt 
from a copyrighted work is used in a book review or a professor's lecture where the 
copier is engaged in creating an original work, fair use may be found. 3 M. NIMMER 
supra note 39 at 13-59. But, a reproduction which is substantially similar and intended 
to serve the same purpose as the original would not be considered a fair use. Id. at 13-59, 
13-64. 
41. L. SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT 31 (1978). See a/so 
Triangle Publications v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 626 F.2d 1171, 1174 (5th Cir. 1980). 
42. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 
(1967). See a/so H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5659, 5680. 
43. Users who videotape copyrighted works in their entirety, adding nothing of 
their own creativity, are faced with this situation. The Second Circuit has noted that 
substantial and verbatim copying has usually precluded a finding of fair use. Rosemont 
Enterprises V. Random House, 366 F.2d 303, 310 (2d Cir. 1966). 
44. 17 U.S.c. § 108(f)(3) (Supp. V 1981). This section indicates that the Act is not 
to "be construed to limit the reproduction and distribution by lending of a limited 
number of copies and excerpts by a library or archives of an audiovisual news program 
...." Id. 
45. Id. § 118(d)(3). The Act provides for such activities as off-the-air videotaping 
of copyrighted program material by public school systems and non-commercial televi­
sion stations for classroom use. Id. 
46. See infra text accompanying notes 48-62. 
47. See supra note 6. 
231 1983) VIDEOTAPING NEWS FOR COMMERCIAL USE 
and decisions are applicable to the videotaping issue when it arises 
in the context of taping television news for commercial use. 
C. The Videotape Copyright Cases 
In the earliest videotaping case, Walt Disney Productions v. 
Alaska Television Network ,48 a federal district court held that off­
the-air videotaping of copyrighted entertainment programs in their 
entirety for later transmission by a remote cable system to its sub­
scribers was a copyright infringement.49 Commentators interpreted 
this holding as the formulation of a rule that off-the-air videotaping 
undertaken for commercial purposes necessarily constitutes copy­
right infringement. 50 
Ten years later, a television commercial was the subject matter 
at issue in Bruzzone v. Miller Brewing Co. 51 The commercial was 
taped off-the-air and six frames of the resulting videotape were used 
by the copier for commercial purposes in his market research busi­
ness.52 The court found that deriving profit from the use of a small 
portion of the work did not render the use unfair, especially in light 
of the fact that the use did not compete with the copyrighted work 
and did not diminish the value of the originaLS3 
Off-the-air videotaping of copyrighted sports programming was 
held to constitute copyright infringement in New Boston Television, 
Inc. v. Entertainment Sports Programming.54 In that case cable oper­
ators transmitted highlights of baseball and hockey games excerpted 
from plaintiffs copyrighted broadcasts to their own cable custom­
48. 310 F. Supp. 1073 (W.D. Wash. 1969). 
49. Id. at 1075. 
50. 3 M. NIMMER supra note 39 at 13-94 states that, "it is clearly an act of copy­
right infringement to reproduce a copyrighted work off the air for commercial purposes 
either by audio tape or video tape." (citing Walt Disney Prods. v. Alaska Television 
Network, 310 F.Supp. 1073 (W.D. Wash. 1969) and New Boston Television v. Entertain­
ment Sports Programming, 1981-83 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) ~ 25,293 (D. Mass. 
1981». Edward B. Samuels has written: "Video recording for commercial purposes, par­
ticularly distribution of copies, would clearly constitute infringement of a copyrighted 
work." Samuels, Copyright and the New Communications Technologies, 25 N.Y.L. SCH. 
L. REV. 905, 915 (1980). Another author has conceded that users of copyrighted materi­
als videotaped off-the-air would have to qualify under the fair use doctrine in order not 
to violate the Copyright Act. Copyright: No Fair Use Excuse jor Sony's Home Vide­
orecording Infringement, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 679, 682-83 (1982). 
51. 202 U.S. P.Q. (BNA) 809, 1978-81 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) ~ 25,105 (N.D. 
Cal. 1979). 
52. Id. at 810,1978-81 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) ~ 25,105, at 15,584-86. 
53. Id. at 811-12, 1978-81 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) ~ 25,105, at 15,587. 
54. 1981-83 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) ~ 25,293 (D. Mass. 1981). 
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ers.55 The issue of whether the potential markets of the copyright 
owner were prejudiced was essential to the court's grant of a prelimi­
nary injunction.56 Although the plaintiff television station had not 
attempted to market game highlights to cable systems, the court 
found that that was not a sufficient basis to permit the defendant to 
appropriate the copyrighted programming and effectively preclude 
the plaintiff from entering that market. It reasoned that copyright 
owners were free to determine when they will exploit their copyright 
in the various markets. 57 
In 1981, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Universal 
City Studios v. Sony Corp. ofAmerica, the Sony Betamax case,58 held 
that off-the-air home videotaping of copyrighted entertainment pro­
gramming for non-commercial home use constitutes an infringement 
of copyright.59 The Supreme Court reversed.60 
The highly organized and systematic practice of making off-the­
air videotapes of copyrighted educational audiovisual materials for 
nonprofit educational use by a school district was not a fair use ac­
cording to the court in Encyclopedia Britannica Educational Corp. v. 
Crooks .61 There, the court relied upon the showing that the unau­
thorized videotaping was the cause of actual, as well as potential, 
harm to the copyright holder's market.62 
The history of the videotape cases indicates that the market fac­
tor has thus far been determinative of the outcome of the fair use 
defense. While the cases to date have concerned the videotaping of 
entertainment, sports, advertising, and educational programs for 
commercial and non-commercial uses, Duncan presents the vide­
otaping question in a new context. For the first time, a court has had 
to deal with off-the-air videotaping of news for commercial use. 63 
The cases and commentators are able to offer little guidance in 
developing an analytical approach to the problem raised in 
Duncan 64 because there are special legal characteristics of broadcast 
news that distinguish it from the types of programming previously 
55. Id. at 16,625, 16,627. 
56. Id. at 16,627. 
57. /d. 
58. 480 F.Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979), affd in part, rev'd in part, 659 F.2d 963 (9th 
Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 457 U.S. 1116 (1982). 
59. 659 F.2d at 977. 
60. 52 U.S.L.W. 4090 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1984). 
61. 542 F.Supp. 1156, 1185 (W.O. N.Y. 1982). 
62. id. at 1170-71. 
63. 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2075 (N.D. Ga. June 28, 1982). 
64. The commentators have not yet considered the unique issues inherent in the 
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litigated.65 As noted above, in enacting the Copyright Act of 1976, 
Congress declined to act on most videotaping issues66 and the Final 
Report to Congress of the National Commission on New Technolog­
ical Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) also sidestepped the 
issue.67 
III. THE ApPLICATION OF FAIR USE ANALYSIS IN WXIA-TV V. 

DUNCAN 

A. Fair Use: The Market Factor 
In Duncan, the court established that plaintiffs news program 
was properly registered68 and that the material contained in the "Fit ­
ness Trail" story was copyrightable.69 The court then considered 
application of fair use standards to the facts of the case, stating that 
the last of the four fair use factors set forth in the Act, the effect on 
potential markets of the copyrighted work,7° was the most impor­
tant,71 The court stated that it would postpone analysis of the other 
fair use factors until trial on the merits. 72 
The court's major concern with regard to the market factor was 
WXIA-TV's allegation that it had both primary and secondary mar­
kets for the sale of its news and that TV News Clips' operation paral­
leled and prejudiced the secondary market,?3 The primary market 
consisted of the advertisers who sponsored the news program and 
nature of copyrighted news and their analyses deal only with content devoid of the spe­
cial characteristics of news. See supra note 50. 
65. See infra text accompanying notes 84-87. 
66. Only two limited instances of videotape copying are mentioned in the Act. See 
supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. 
67. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED 
WORKS, FINAL REPORT 79 (Libr. of Congo ed. 1979) (stating that "the issues involved in 
off-the-air videotaping were essentially matters requiring public policy decisions and 
should be left for the courts to decide."). 
68. 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 2077. 
69. Id. at 2077-78. 
70. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (Supp. V 1981) states that the fourth factor is "the effect of 
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work." Id. The section 
also indicates that there may be other determinative factors in addition to those listed in 
the Act. Id. The Second Circuit, in Meeropol V. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), 
stated the proposition simply: "A key issue in fair use cases is whether defendant's use 
tends to diminish or prejudice the potential sale of plaintitrs work." Id. at 1070. 
7\. 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 2078. See also Triangle Publications V. Knight 
Ridder Newspapers, 445 F.Supp. 875 (S.D. Fla. 1978), affd, 626 F.2d 1171, 1175, 1177; 3 
M. NIMMER supra note 39 at 13-64; L. SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN COpy­
RIGHT 32 (1978) (stating that the fourth fair use factor is the most important.) 
72. 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 2080. 
73. Id. at 2079 n.lO. 
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the secondary market was made up of the subjects and entities in the 
news stories.74 
The court stated that evidence of the extent of WXIA-TV's ac­
tual or planned participation in the secondary market was necessary 
to enable application of a functional test for fair use.75 This func­
tional test is meant to determine whether a user's copy serves the 
same function and therefore can fulfill the demand for the copyright 
holder's original work.76 If it is shown that the copy is a reasonable 
substitute for the original, then under the functional test, the defense 
of fair use is unavailing as the user's copy may harm the market for 
the original.77 Lacking the necessary information, the court was un­
able to decide whether TV News Clips had prejudiced a pre-existing 
or anticipated market of the plaintiff. 78 
B. Fair Use: The Nature of the Copyrighted Material 
In addition to proposing use of the functional test for determin­
ing the effect on the market, the court expressed serious reservations 
regarding the propriety of a television station cultivating a market 
for the sale of video news clips among the subjects of its newscasts.79 
These doubts arose both from an awareness of the need for a broad­
caster to maintain a reputation for journalistic integrity in order to 
attract sponsors and the obligations of a broadcaster to serve the 
public interest. 80 The court speculated that "[i]f there are certain in­
herent boundaries, arising from the peculiar nature of broadcast 
news, on Plaintiffs use of its news stories, and if Defendant's use lies 
outside those boundaries, then it may be impossible for Plaintiffs 
74. Id. at 2078-79 n.9. 
75. Id. at 2079. 
76. Wainwright Securities v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978). As explained in 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 39, at 
13-67 to 13-69, if plaintiff is a publisher of sheet music and defendant engages in the 
unauthorized publication of plaintiffs lyrics in a magazine, the use is a non-infringing 
fair use as the function it serves is different from that of the original. Plaintiffs sheet 
music is intended to be used for musical performances while defendant's use is a literary 
presentation. The magazine article cannot fulfill the same function as the sheet music. 
But if defendant reproduced song sheets, it would be an infringement as the song sheets 
can be used for musical presentation in the same way as the original. Id. 
77. Iowa State Univ. v. American Broadcasting Cos, 621 F.2d 57, 61-62 (2d Cir. 
1980); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Productions, 479 F.Supp. 351, 
361 (N.0. Ga. 1979); Roy Export Co. Establishment v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 503 
F.Supp. 1137, 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); 3 M. NIMMER supra note 39, at 13-66, 13-67, 13-70. 
78. 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 2080 n.ll. 
79. Id. at 2078. 
80. Id. at 2078-79 n.9. 
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and Defendant's purposes to overlap."81 By recognizing the "pecu­
liar nature of broadcast news," the court has implied that the second 
fair use factor, "the nature of the copyrighted work," may be a major 
concern when broadcast news programming is videotaped.82 The 
court implied that when program content is not vested with public 
interest, the market factor is logically the weightiest consideration in 
a videotape copyright case.83 When a news program is at issue, how­
ever, the court indicated the nature of the work can justifiably mod­
ify the analysis of the market factor. Although the Duncan court did 
not explicitly acknowledge reliance upon the second factor, its un­
derlying rationale broke new ground in the analysis of videotape 
copyright cases. 
IV. BROADCAST NEWS: THE UNIQUE ASPECT OF 
WXIA-TV V. DUNCAN 
Any comprehensive analysis of the videotaping of news must 
take into account two key aspects of broadcast news: the nature of 
copyright protection accorded to news and the public interest char­
acteristic of the news. The copyright protection afforded news is dif­
ferent from that afforded other materials because, unlike other 
materials, the news itself cannot be copyrighted.84 The first author 
to report an event does not have a monopoly on the coverage of that 
event. Instead, only the form of expression and the literary quality 
of a news report may be accorded copyright protection.85 The 
81. Id. at 2079 n.lO. 
82. See supra text accompanying note 38. 
83. 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 2078. On that basis, copyright protection was af­
forded to producers of entertainment and sports programming for broadcast television 
because they had potential markets for their product on cable television. Walt Disney 
Prods. v. Alaska Television Network, 310 F.Supp. 1073, 1075 (W.D. Wash. 1969); New 
Boston Television v. Entertainment Sports Programming, 1981-83 COPYRIGHT L. REP. 
(CCH) ~ 25,293 (D.Mass. 1981). The decisions in Encyclopedia Britannica Educational 
Corp. v. Crooks, 447 F.Supp. 243 (W.D.N.Y. 1978),542 F.Supp. 1156 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) 
and Bruzzone v. Miller Brewing Co., 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 809, 1978-1981 COPYRIGHT L. 
REp. ~ 25,105 (N.D. Cal. 1979) dealt with the effects of the activities of users on the 
existing primary market of the copyright holder for advertising and educational materi­
als. Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp., 480 F.Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979) t:ifj'd in part, 
rev'd in part, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 457 U.S. 1116, concerned the 
harm caused to plaintiffs' primary market for the sale of entertainment programs to thea­
ters and television networks by the entry of defendants into the secondary market for 
home videorecording in which plaintiff did not participate. 
84. Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F.Supp. 130, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
85. See Chicago Record-Herald v. Tribune Ass'n., 275 F. 797, 798 (7th Cir. 1921); 
Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F.Supp. 130, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); I M. NIMMER 
supra note 34, at 2-158 to 2-160. 
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holder of a copyright in a news program thus has only partial copy­
right protection. 
The news, whether broadcast or conveyed in print, also is set 
apart because of its public interest characteristic and the essential 
role of the free press in our democracy. 86 There is a strong interest 
in unlimited access to the news in order to keep the public informed. 
Because of this, fair use may be found when there is a "public inter­
est in having the fullest information available."87 To assure that the 
news is a reliable source of information, there is also a need for the 
exercise of journalistic integrity.88 
The uniqueness of broadcast journalism stems from the philoso­
phy of broadcast regulation in the United States. Regulation of 
broadcasting, including allocation of frequencies within the radio 
spectrum, was instituted in 192789 to end the chaos prevailing in the 
industry.9o As the spectrum of radio frequencies is finite,91 not all 
who apply for licenses to broadcast can be accommodated.92 There­
fore, the Federal Radio Commission, the predecessor to the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), concluded that this scarcity of 
frequencies necessitated that licenses be awarded only to the compet­
ing applicants demonstrating responsiveness to the public "conven­
ience, interest or necessity."93 
As a public trustee, the broadcaster's obligation is to inform the 
public fairly and impartially.94 The broadcaster's latitude of jour­
nalistic freedom is circumscribed by that public responsibility.95 Op­
erating in the public interest requires, for example, that broadcasters 
devote air time to matters of public significance and that news re­
ports be journalistically balanced.96 In broadcast journalism, unlike 
86. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971). 
87. Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F.Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
88. In re CBS Program "Hunger in America", 20 F.C.C.2d 143, 152 (1969). 
89. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 632, 44 Stat. 1162, repealed by The Communi­
cations Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 416 § 602,48 Stat. 1102. 
90. Red Lion Broadcasting v. F.C.C. 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969). 
91. The radio spectrum and the frequencies which comprise the spectrum are lim­
ited because the airwaves are capable of carrying only a certain number of signals. D. 
PEMBER, MASS MEDIA LAW 423 (2d ed. 1981). 
92. Columbia Broadcasting sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 
(1973). 
93. Red Lion Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1969) (quoting Radio 
Act of 1927 § 4, 44 Stat. 1163). 
94. Columbia Broadcasting sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm. 412 U.S. 94, 117 
( 1973). 
95. Id. at 110. 
96. Red Lion Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 377 (quoting Great Lakes 
Broadcasting, 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32, 33 (1929), rev'd on other grounds, 37 F.2d 993, cert. 
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print journalism, the interest at stake is not the broadcaster's right to 
speak, but the right of the public to be informed.97 It follows that 
broadcasters violate their public trust if they distort or stage the 
news.98 
It was the problem of staging and distortion that the court in 
Duncan anticipated in considering whether a television station could 
create a market for the sale of souvenir news clips in an attempt to 
generate additional revenue.99 The court suggested that the entry of 
a television station into the secondary market created the potential 
for abuse of its public trust 100 through the production of stories 
about the subjects and entities who were likely to buy videotape 
clips. 101 
Ideally, a decision in a case involving the videotaping of news 
will take into account the copyright considerations and the unique 
aspects of broadcasting: the public interest in widespread dissemina­
tion of impartial news reports. An ideal decision will also recognize 
the need for flexibility in dealing with new technologies and the fact 
that news is accorded only partial copyright protection. 
In deciding WXIA-TV v. Duncan on the merits, the court con­
fronts three possible resolutions to the issue: That the use by TV 
News Clips constituted a copyright infringement; 102 that the use was 
dismissed, 281 U.S. 706 (1930». The enforcement mechanism lies in the power of the 
government to grant or deny requests for license renewals and construction permits. 47 
U.S.c. § 307 (Supp. V 1981 & West 1983),47 C.F.R. § 73.3591 (1982). 
97. Red Lion Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367,390 (1969); Columbia Broad­
casting sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102, 112-13 (1973). 
98. In re CBS Program "Hunger in America," 20 F.C.C. 2d 143, 150 (1969) (stat­
ing that the F.C.C. can investigate if there is "material indication of extrinsic evidence of 
staging or distortion," quoting from Letter to ABC, 16 F.C.C. 2d 650 (1969». See also 
National Org. for Women V. F.C.C., 555 F.2d 1002, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (stating that 
"the licensee's news judgment will not be questioned unless there is extrinsic evidence of 
deliberate distortion or news staging. . . or unless the licensee consistently fails to report 
news events of public importance that could not in good faith be ignored."). 
99. 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 2078-79 n.9. 
100. Although the Duncan court did not name the specific abuses of public trust 
which it considered likely, a list of possible abuses stemming from the production of 
stories about likely clip customers can be formulated from a survey of broadcasters' trus­
teeship responsibilities. Abuses might include diminishing journalistic integrity, lessen­
ing of impartiality, decreasing amounts of time devoted to matters of public significance 
and the undermining of journalistic balance. See supra text accompanying notes 94-98. 
Staging and distortion of the news are logical outcomes of a decision to produce news 
stories for the purpose of generating clip sales among the subjects and entities in the 
stories. 
101. Id. at 2079 n.lO. 
102. This holding would be consistent with previous copyright decisions in Univer­
sal City Studios V. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981); Encyclopedia Britannica 
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not an infringement as WXIA-TV is precluded from entering the 
secondary market; 103 or that the use did not constitute an infringe­
ment as copyright protection is not afforded to the secondary market 
for news broadcasts. 104 A finding of infringement, while protecting 
plaintiffs secondary market, would ignore the public interest in 
widespread dissemination of the news lO5 by cutting off a distributor 
to the secondary market. The finding of infringement would also 
reflect an unwarranted rigidity in that it would fail to accomodate a 
videotape technology,I06 which is capable only of producing copies 
bearing substantial similarity to the original. 107 The question would 
still remain whether the television station's monopolistic activity in . 
the secondary market would lead eventually to abuse of its public 
trusteeship responsibilities. 108 
By postulating that the unique qualities of broadcast journalism 
may prevent television stations from exploiting the secondary mar­
ket, the court indicated a predisposition to a finding for the defend­
ant based upon the conclusion that public interest considerations 
would preclude WXIA-TV's entry into the secondary market. 109 
Forbidding a broadcaster's entry into this secondary market in order 
to permit unlimited videotape copying and promote the public inter­
est, is a severe measure and would make public trusteeship unneces­
sarily burdensome. I 10 
Application of this mechanism as a means to guarantee respon­
sible trusteeship and stifle opportunities for abuse also would require 
a distinct departure from current practice. At present, broadcasters 
are not prohibited from developing secondary markets for the sale of 
Educ. corp. v. Crooks, 542 F.Supp. 1156 (W.D.N.Y. 1982); Walt Disney Productions v. 
Alaska Television Network, 310 F.Supp. 1073 (W.D. Wash. 1969) and New Boston Tele­
vision v. Entertainment Sports Programming, 1981 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) ~ 25,293 
(D. Mass. 1981). 
103. This holding is suggested by the court in the instant case, 8 MEDIA L. REP. 
(BNA) at 2079 n.lO. 
104. A similar decision in Bruzzone v. Miller Co., 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 809, 1978­
81 COPYRIGHT L. REP. ~ 25,105 (N.D. Cal. 1979) was based on a finding that the copy of 
a small portion of the original did not serve the same function or decrease the value of 
the copyrighted work. 
105. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971); Time Inc. v. 
Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F.Supp. 130, 146 (S.D. N.Y. 1968). 
106. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code 
Congo & Ad. News 5659, 5680. 
107. See JUpra notes 39, 43. 
108. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117 
(1973). 
109. 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 2079 n.lO. 
110. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. V. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 110. 
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videotape clips of their stories. This is exemplified by the fact that 
WXIA-TV, without any reservation as to its propriety or legality, 
has been able to assert its position in the secondary market. 111 Fur­
ther, In re CBS Program "Hunger in America" I 12 and National Or­
ganizationfor Women v. F. C C 113 indicate that the FCC will inquire 
into allegations of distortion and staging only in the most extreme 
situations. 114 The current standard in broadcast journalism has been 
protected and maintained by the exercise of the news judgment of 
the broadcaster which generally is questioned by the FCC only when 
trusteeship responsibilities are flagrantly or consistently flouted. I IS 
Since the current standard provides adequate protection without re­
sort to severe constraints, it is unnecessary to deny the broadcaster's 
entry into the secondary market as a means of alleviating concern 
about the reliability of broadcast news. 
An approach that would withhold copyright protection from the 
holder's secondary market also presents a problem in that failure to 
protect an established or potential market of a plaintiff in a videotap­
ing case is inconsistent with the application of orthodox fair use 
analysis. 116 Traditionally, when the use parallels or prejudices the 
copyright holder's actual or potential market, infringement has been 
found. ll7 Orthodox fair use analysis, however, may be altered in 
certain circumstances. 
The copyright clause is designed to encourage the dissemipation 
of information and ideas I 18 while public policy dictates full access to 
undistorted news reporting. 119 Videotape technology is capable of 
serving those goals by increasing the availability of news stories. But 
videotaping, because of its limited ability only to make verbatim 
copies, is also in conflict with copyright law. 120 Verbatim copying by 
videotape captures not only the news, it appropriates the author's 
form of expression which may be protected by copyright law.121 
When a copyright problem such as this is created by the use of a new 
III. Plaintiffs Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 2. 
112. 20 F.C.C. 2d 143, 150 (1969). 
113. 555 F.2d 1002, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
114. See supra note 98. 
115. Id. See also Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 
U.S. at 110 (explaining that "Congress intended to permit private broadcasting to de­
velop with the widest journalistic freedom consistent with its public obligations."). 
116. See supra text accompanying notes 37-43, 48-62. 
117. 3 M. NIMMER supra note 37, at 13-66 to 13-67. 
118. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28. 
119. See supra text accompanying notes 86-88. 
120. See supra text accompanying notes 39-43. 
121. See supra text accompanying note 85. 
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technology, Congress has authorized the application ofjudicial inno­
vation. 122 The legislative history of the fair use doctrine, as embod­
ied in the Copyright Act of 1976, illustrates the intention of Congress 
to grant courts the freedom to adapt the doctrine on a case-by-case 
basis when the copyright issues arise from the use of technological 
innovations.123 This intent was confirmed at the time of passage 
when it was declared that "there is no disposition to freeze the doc­
trine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological 
change."124 Thus, orthodox fair use analysis may be altered when 
the copyright issues arise due to the use of a new technology. Since 
the peculiar qualities of videotape technology have given rise to the 
copyright issue in Duncan, the court essentially has Congressional 
approval to fashion a decision not rooted in orthodox fair use 
rationale. 125 
When the issue presented is the copying of news, there is added 
justification for modifying fair use analysis by giving less weight to 
the fourth, or market, factor and giving more than traditional em­
phasis to the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted material. 
The justification for the shift lies in the fact that, unlike entertain­
ment programming, news is vested with unique qualities which in­
clude a strong public interest and that, in any event, only partial 
copyright protection can be afforded to any news story.126 
The concept of fair use embodies the balancing of the public 
interest and the interest of the copyright holder, which were estab­
lished in the Copyright Clause of the Constitution. 127 Viewed as a 
dual risk approach, each "determination of fair use . . . will decide 
whether the [copyright holder's] expectation of economic reward was 
or was not appropriate, and such a determination ought to coincide 
with a simultaneous judgment about whether society's expectation of 
122. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
123. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Congo 1st Sess. 32 
(1967). 
124. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 5659, 5680. 
125. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Congo 1st Sess. 32 
(1967). 
We endorse the purpose and general scope of ... the doctrine in the statute, 
especially during a period of rapid technological change. Beyond a very broad 
statutory explanation of what fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, 
the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case­
by-case basis. 
Id. 
126. See Time Inc. V. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F.Supp. 130, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
127. See supra text accompanying note 27. 
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denial of access was or was not appropriate."128 Due to the magni­

tude of the public interest in the widest possible dissemination of 

information, the balance is tipped in favor of the user when the con­

tent of the broadcast is news. It is for this reason that the "scope of 

fair use is greater when informational type works, as opposed to 

more creative products, are involved."129 This means that the rela­

tive importance of the second fair use factor, the nature of the copy­

righted work, is far greater when news is at issue than when 

. entertainment programming is in question. 130 Consideration of the 

nature of the work, then, will justifiably modify an analysis of the 

market effect. 
By giving added recognition to the nature of the copyrighted 
work, the court in Duncan may find a fair use which will allow the 
plaintiff and defendant to operate in the same market. Such a deci­
sion will accomodate the public interest, permit the broadcaster to 
exploit the secondary market, and will responsibly acknowledge the 
realities and limitations of videotape technology. The secondary 
market will be open to as many distributors as choose to compete. 
This will allow for widespread dissemination of the news and should 
curb any tendency by the television station to distort or stage the 
news in order to stimulate clip sales. The benefits to the station of 
that kind of manipulation would be less significant in the situation in 
which total revenues from clip sales are shared among competitors. 
The opening of the secondary market will also recognize a legitimate 
use of videotape technology by those who are not broadcasters and 
lack the capability or intent to disturb the broadcasters' primary 
market. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The short history of videotape copyright cases consists of deci­
sions based primarily on the fair use market factor and deal with 
creative entertainment programs not vested with a public interest. 131 
Where there has been any prejudice to an existing or potential mar­
ket by a user, an infringement has been found. 132 
Duncan raised the videotaping issue in the context of news and 
the court indicated that the previously employed analysis was inca­
128. L. SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT 30-31 (1978). 
129. Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 972 (1981). 
130. Id. 
131. See supra text accompanying notes 46-60. 
132. Id. 
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pable of resolving the unique concerns of broadcast journalism. \33 
The news itself is not copyrightable; there is a public interest in mak­
ing news widely available; and public trusteeship requires the broad­
caster to air impartial reports on important issues. The court 
suggested that these distinguishing features made it necessary in this 
instance to give emphasis to another fair use factor, the nature of the 
copyrighted material. 134 
While the plaintiff, WXIA-TV, sought protection for its secon­
dary market in sales of news clips to the subjects of its news stories, 
the court questioned whether the nature of broadcast journalism did 
not preclude the television station from making such sales. There 
would be no incentive to plan deliberately news stories about likely 
customers for clips if the television station could not add to its reve­
nues in this manner.135 The Duncan court suggested a two step ap­
proach. The first step it is to determine whether the broadcaster can 
operate legitimately in the secondary market. The second step is 
traditional market factor analysis in which the user will have a fair 
use if the owner does not have a potential secondary market at 
stake. 136 
While it is desirable that the law take cognizance of the realities 
and the pervasiveness of videotape technology, as directed in the leg­
islative history of the Copyright Act of 1976, the solution proposed 
by the court is unduly harsh on the copyright holder. Thoughtful 
consideration of broadcast regulations shows that it is unnecessary to 
prevent a broadcaster from entering a secondary market in order to 
maintain current journalistic standards. 137 
If the courts consider the second fair use factor, "the nature of 
the copyrighted work," in addition to the market factor, a more 
fitting outcome can be achieved. The special characteristics of 
broadcast news, the need for widespread dissemination, and prohibi­
tion against distortion are best served by a finding of fair use. All 
current markets for the distribution of WXIA-TV's news stories, in­
cluding WXIA-TV's secondary market, can be preserved if the mar­
ket factor alone is not determinative. The rewards of intentional 
staging of news stories are minimized when the plaintiff has to share 
the fruits of the market with defendant and other prospective com­
133. 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 2078-79. 
134. Id. at 2079 n.lO. 
135. Id. at 2078 n.9. 
136. Id. at 2079 n.lO. 
137. See supra note 111-115 and accompanying text. 
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petitors. This holding will move the law one step closer to defining 
correctly the parameters of legitimate videotaping activity. 
Joan C Steiger 
A UTHOR'S NOTE: The merits of WXIA-TV v. Duncan were decided on 
October 13, 1983. The court held that the verbatim copying and sale of the 
"Fitness Trail" segment by Ms. Duncan constituted infringement of 
WXIA-TV's copyright in that news feature story. Defendant Duncan's fair 
use defense failed as her use was not an "inherently productive or creative 
use" within the meaning of section 107. The court, however, found no basis 
on which to grant WXIA-TV's request for injunctive relief. The court 
noted that the television station abandons its copyright by destroying tapes 
of news broadcasts one week after air date and maintenance of copyright 
protection in the secondary market is not needed to provide a creative in­
centive to WXIA-TV. The court stated, in addition, that Ms. Duncan's 
copying and sales could represent a modest social benefit since the news 
broadcasts of WXIA-TV are "infused with a high degree of public interest," 
although her activity "does not substantially further public dissemination 
or perpetuation of news accounts." 
At trial, the plaintiff, WXIA-TV, did not assert prejudice to its secon­
dary market and actual damages were found to be de minimis. Judgment 
was entered for the plaintiff in the amount of $35. WXIA-TV v. Duncan, 
572 F. Supp. 1186 (N.D. Ga. 1983). 
